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IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
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In 1972 leaders of most of the nations of the world gathered in 
Stockholm for an historic first global summit on the environment, the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.1 By a vote of 112-
0, representatives of the nations assembled at that conference adopted a 
declaration emphasizing the importance of protecting the planet’s 
environment and outlining foundational principles of environmental law.2 
Now, more than four decades later, nearly all countries have adopted 
substantial environmental laws.3 But despite considerable progress, 
pollution problems still pose fundamental threats to public health in some 
parts of the world. 
China sent a large delegation to the 1972 Stockholm Conference, 
which helped prompt the development of Chinese domestic environmental 
law and policy.4 Today China has an impressive body of national 
environmental laws, but they often are poorly implemented and enforced.5 
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 1. See GÜNTHER HANDL, DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE 
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (STOCKHOLM DECLARATION), 1972 AND THE RIO DECLARATION ON 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 1992 1 (2012), available at http://legal.un.org/ 
avl/pdf/ha/dunche/dunche_e.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 2. 
 3.  See Dr. Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law: Rethinking the 
Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2001) (showing that, after 1970, there were 305 
multilateral environmental agreements, while between 1800 and 1970, there were only 182); About, 
ECOLEX.ORG, http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/About_en_US;DIDPFDSIjsessionid= 
AD572EC08D01F18C0BEC45BE5BED28D5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (“Environmental law has, 
over the past thirty years, . . . [seen] a significant growth in multilateral and bilateral agreements, 
national legislation, international ‘soft law’ documents, and law and policy literature, as well as related 
jurisprudence and court decisions.”). 
 4. CHARLES R. MCELWEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CHINA: MITIGATING RISK AND ENSURING 
COMPLIANCE 22–23 (2011). 
 5. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 525 (2002) 
(“[A]lthough there are environmental laws on the books, they frequently go unenforced, in part because 
of lack of political will to enforce them if that means slowing down economic growth.”); Arwen Joyce 
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Coupled with rapid industrial development, poor enforcement has resulted 
in massive environmental problems.6 As a public, enraged by deteriorating 
environmental conditions, demands action from the country’s new leaders, 
many believe that China should embrace the U.S. model of environmental 
law.7 A prominent feature of the U.S. model is its emphasis on encouraging 
civil society to participate in the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental policy.8 Politically powerful regulated 
industries and environmental NGOs wage fierce lobbying campaigns in 
Congress and before the agencies.9 Agencies must solicit and consider 
public input before issuing regulations.10 Everyone affected by agency 
actions has the right to seek judicial review of those actions and ordinary 
citizens and NGOs may file lawsuits to enforce U.S. environmental laws.11 
 
& Tracye Winfrey, Taming the Red Dragon: A Realistic Assessment of the ABA's Legal Reform Efforts 
in China, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 887, 891–92 (2004) (discussing enforcement challenges faced by 
environmental regulators in China). 
 6. For example, in January 2013, air pollution in Beijing reached levels described online by 
locals as “postapocalyptic,” “terrifying,” and “beyond belief” and by the U.S. Embassy’s @BeijingAir 
Twitter feed as “Beyond Index.” Edward Wong, On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing’s Air Quality Tops 
‘Crazy Bad’ at 755, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, at A16. Epidemiologists working with the World Health 
Organization estimate that air pollution in China causes 1.2 million premature deaths annually. Edward 
Wong, Early Deaths Linked to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at A9. The Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning estimated in 2010 that 
environmental damage robbed the Chinese economy of approximately $230 billion, or 3.5% of the 
country’s gross domestic product. Edward Wong, Cost of Environmental Damage in China Growing 
Rapidly Amid Industrialization, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, at A4. 
7.   C.f. Joyce & Winfrey, supra note 5, at 891–92 (Because China’s original model of  leaving 
environmental enforcement up to local governments led to unpredictable enforcement efforts, critics are 
urging China to increase the public’s ability to participate and for the central government to regulate on 
the regional scale). 
 8. A plaintiff suing under environmental citizen lawsuit provisions has been referred to as a 
“private attorney general.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737–38 (1972). Most major 
environmental laws in the United States have citizen suit provisions. See, e.g., Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006); 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006); Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2006); Noise Control Act of 1972, 
42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2006); Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j- 8 (2006). Some environmental statutes do not contain citizen 
suit provisions, notably the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 
136 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
 9. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1981). 
 10. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring for all rulemaking 
conducted by federal agencies, that “[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation”). 
 11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (generally permitting judicial review of all final actions taken by federal 
agencies). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d 544, 545–46 (D.D.C. 2005) (recounting a 
history of suits against EPA to compel them to comply with statutory deadlines in the Clean Air Act). 
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Could the key to China controlling its environmental problems be to 
empower Chinese civil society along the lines of the U.S. model? Although 
air and water pollution have become so severe that the Chinese public is 
demanding more effective government action to combat them, China has a 
very different legal and political culture than the United States. This article 
questions the notion that transplanting the U.S. model of civil society’s role 
necessarily would make Chinese environmental law yield dramatically 
improved results. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article compares the roles of civil society in the various stages of 
U.S. and Chinese environmental governance. Part II compares the 
historical evolution of environmental NGOs in the U.S. and China. Part III 
examines the process of adopting environmental legislation in the two 
countries. Part IV discusses the influence of civil society on the process of 
issuing regulations to implement the environmental laws in the U.S. and 
China. Part V examines judicial review of environmental regulations. Part 
VI discusses the role of civil society in the enforcement of environmental 
regulations in the U.S. and China. 
The strategies employed by NGOs to promote environmental 
protection have broadened in recent years to include transparency 
initiatives that encourage companies to voluntarily improve their 
environmental practices. Part VII of the paper discusses such initiatives in 
the U.S. and China. Part VIII of the paper concludes by discussing what the 
U.S. can learn from China and what China can learn from the U.S. with 
respect to improving environmental governance through empowerment of 
civil society. It cautions that one should not assume that aspects of one’s 
legal system can be transplanted effectively to the other. China’s 
experience illustrates that avoiding a “race to the bottom” is an important 
reason for maintaining powerful environment agencies at the federal level. 
While China has the luxury of being able to enact tough environmental 
laws with little effective opposition from the regulated community, the lack 
of hard-fought legislative battles that produce compromises with industry 
also may be a contributing factor to China’s greater problem of enforcing 
its environmental laws. 
 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS 
 
Although environmental NGOs have a longer history in the United 
States than in China, there has been a recent surge in the growth of 
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environmental NGOs in China.12 This section compares their evolution in 
the U.S. with China’s recent experience. 
 
A. Environmental NGOs in the United States 
The rise of the modern environmental movement in the U.S. is often 
traced to 1962 when Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was published.13 Silent 
Spring alerted the public to the possibility that pesticides could be 
accumulating in the food chain in a way that could cause severe, long-term 
environmental damage.14 In 1967, the Environmental Defense Fund was 
formed by a group of scientists who sought to have DDT banned because it 
was precisely that kind of pesticide.15 Another group, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), was created in an effort to force the 
Federal Power Commission to consider environmental concerns when 
licensing an electric power project that would have destroyed a particularly 
scenic and historic stretch of the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain.16 
At the time, no federal agencies shouldered primary responsibility for 
responding to concerns about environmental protection. The new 
environmental groups went to court to try to require government agencies 
to be more responsive to environmental concerns. 
To be sure, conservation groups had been in existence in the United 
States for more than seven decades when Silent Spring was published. The 
Sierra Club, founded in 1892, played a major role in early twentieth 
century battles concerning management of public lands.17 But the 
environmental groups formed in the 1960s and 70s fundamentally differed 
from the older conservation groups in their level of activism.18 They were 
 
 12. See TIMOTHY HILDEBRANDT, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE IN 
CHINA 1–2 (2013) (“In the past decade, social organizations [including environmental ones] have 
quickly sprouted in China.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Sally J. Kelley, An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Environmental Law 
Resources of Interest to Practicing Attorneys, 1995 ARK. L. NOTES 111, 111 (1995) (“In 1962 the 
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring led to widespread public awareness, concern, and 
discussion [and activism, which] served as catalysts to the enactment of significant environmental 
protection legislation and to the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Our Mission and History, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.org/about/our-mission-and-
history (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). See generally THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981) (chronicling the efforts of the Environmental Defense Fund against DDT). 
 16. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 136–43 (1993); E-Law: What Started it All?, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL (May 5, 2000), http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp. 
 17. SIERRA CLUB, HISTORY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1, available at http://www.sierraclub 
.org/history/downloads/SCtimeline.pdf. 
 18. See SAMUEL P. HAYES, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 13–14 (1989) (discussing how the conservation in the early twentieth 
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committed to influencing environmental policy at every stage of legislative 
and regulatory processes.19 The membership of these new environmental 
NGOs grew dramatically in the next few decades. It is estimated that in 
1960 approximately 150,000 people had contributed to environmental 
NGOs in the U.S. and that their combined annual budgets totaled less than 
$20 million.20 By the end of the 1980s, eight million people in the U.S. had 
contributed to 100 national environmental NGOs that had a combined 
budget of more than $500 million.21 
The growth of U.S. environmental NGOs was fueled in part by 
funding from foundations. The Ford Foundation, which expressly sought to 
promote the development of public interest law in the early 1970s, 
provided important seed money for some of the new environmental 
groups.22 Early victories of the modern U.S. environment movement 
attracted additional membership contributions and spurred political 
entrepreneurs to expand their range of actions. 
 
B. Environmental NGOs in China 
Civil society organizations have had a long and sometimes turbulent 
history in China from ancient times to the present.23 Following the 
Communist Revolution of 1946 “civil society virtually disappeared as a 
bottom-up movement” in China.24 Fearing the development of competitors 
to its power, the Communist Party repressed civil society organizations, 
which reemerged only slowly after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms.25 
In recent years China’s civil society has played an increasingly 
important role in environmental protection. First, since the 1990s the 
 
century differed from the much more popular environmental movement that emerged after World War 
II and grew over the following decades). See also id. at 53 (discussing rapid growth of the Sierra Club 
and National Wildlife Federation during the 1960s); id. at 60 (discussing the formation of groups such 
as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council, during the late 1960s 
and the 1970s). 
 19. See id. at 60–61 (discussing how environmental groups in the 1970s were able to advocate 
with “considerable effectiveness in judicial and administrative as well as legislative decision making”). 
 20. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective Action, 9 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 9, 13 (1998). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See FORD FOUNDATION, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM: NEW VOICES FOR NEW 
CONSTITUENCIES 5, 20, 23 (1973) (noting that the Foundation donated over $4 million to public interest 
firms between 1970 and 1973, including the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, now Earthjustice). 
 23. See generally KARLA W. SIMON, CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM 
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE “NEW REFORM ERA” 369 –71 (2013) (detailing the history of civil society 
organizations beginning in the Qin dynasty). 
 24. Id. at 370. 
 25. Id. 
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number of environmental NGOs in China has increased significantly.26 
Second, mass citizen activism, often focusing on “not in my backyard” 
(NIMBY) issues, has been on the rise in China.27 Third, the use of legal 
processes by individual citizens and lawyers through petitions, lawsuits, 
and other forms of activism has increased.28 Civil society is playing an 
increasingly important role in efforts to awaken environmental awareness, 
strengthen environmental protection legislation, expose illegal business 
activity and governmental failures, and to promote environmental dispute 
resolution. 
China’s first significant environmental NGO was “Friends of Nature”, 
a grassroots NGO similar to modern NGOs.29 Environmental NGOs were 
pioneers in the Chinese NGO movement, and today they play a vital role in 
the growth and development of Chinese NGOs.30 Among the current NGOs 
in China, environmental NGOs are believed to be the most active and the 
groups with the greatest social impact. 
The history of environmental NGOs in China is not a long one, but it 
has had many twists and turns. Chinese NGOs, especially those at the 
grassroots level, have faced many institutional obstacles in the course of 
their development. These include the difficulty of registering as NGOs, 
financing difficulties and, other constraints on carrying out their activities. 
Many environmental groups that function essentially as NGOs do not meet 
the Chinese government’s formal qualifications for registration.31 In this 
article we treat these groups as environmental NGOs, even if they are not 
formally registered as such by the Chinese government. 
 
 26. All China Env’t Fed’n, Summary Report on the Development of China’s Environmental Civil 
Society Organizations in 2008 1 (Oct. 30–31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
www.acef.com.cn/uploads/soft/131220/down_1.doc. 
 27. See e.g., Paul Mooney, Citizen Activism, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6416; Wanxin Li, Jieyan Liu & Duoduo Li, Getting Their Voices 
Heard: Three Cases of Public Participation in Environmental Protection in China, 98 J. ENVTL. 
MGMT. 65, 71 (discussing citizen activism and NIMBY attitude in reaction to the Liu Li Tun garbage 
incineration project in China). 
 28. Randall Peerenboom, China's Legal System: A Bum Rap?, UCLA ASIA INST., 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/news/article.asp?parentid=2878 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) 
(“Increasingly, citizens are willing to take on the government through administrative reconsideration 
and litigation.”). 
 29. See Michael M. Gunter, Jr. & Ariane C. Rosen, Two-Level Games of International 
Environmental NGOs in China, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 270, 273 (2012) (“Beginning with the first 
domestic NGO, Friends of Nature in 1994 . . . .”). 
 30. Guosheng Deng (邓国胜), Research on Development Index of China Environmental NGO, 6 
CHINA NON-PROFIT REV. 200, 201 (2010); Chen Jie, The NGO Community in China, 68 CHINA 
PERSPECTIVES 29, ¶ 4 (2006). 
 31. Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 273 (“NGO registration remains one of the most imposing 
obstacles for NGOs in China.”). 
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1. Characteristics of Chinese Environmental NGOs 
 
a. Development Is Rapid but Legal Recognition Remains Difficult 
 
The number of China’s environmental NGOs is increasing rapidly. A 
survey conducted by the All China Environment Federation in 2008 found 
that the number of environmental NGOs in China exceeded 3,500, an 
approximately 28% increase over the number in 2005.32 These included 
more than 1,300 government-supported environmental NGOs, more than 
1,380 student groups, more than 500 grass roots organizations, and 90 
branches of international environmental NGOs.33 The number of grass 
roots NGOs had more than doubled from 2005, increasing by more than 
300.34 
Chinese law requires environmental NGOs to obtain the identity of a 
corporation and their activities must be in accordance with “Regulations for 
Registration and Management of Social Organizations”, (issued 1998)” and 
“Provisional Regulations for the Registration Administration of People-Run 
non-Enterprise Units.35 NGOs accept double-layered management., 
wherein registration is managed by the civil affairs department36 while day-
to-day business is managed by the competent business unit.37 The latter has 
been given great power to review and monitor the activities of the 
environmental NGOs, and to investigate and punish their misdeeds.38 To 
avoid those kinds of responsibilities, the competent business unit often 
refuses to affiliate with environmental NGOs, which severely restricts the 
establishment of environmental NGOs.39 In addition, the above regulations 
still establish many substantive restrictions, which have become major 
institutional obstacles for the development of environmental NGOs.40 
 
 32. All China Env’t Fed’n, supra note 26, at 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 278–79 (summarizing major registration laws, 
including the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (revised) and 
Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of Popular Non-enterprise Work Units). 
 36. Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organisations, CHINA DEV. BRIEF 
(Nov. 11, 1999, 10:14 AM), http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/298. Article 6 provides that 
“[t]he Ministry of Civil Affairs and local Civil Affairs departments . . . are the peoples government 
agencies for registration and management of social organisations. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 280 (“[M]any government organizations are reluctant 
to take on the responsibilities and potential liabilities of becoming a sponsor organization.”). 
 40. See generally id. at 279–80. For example, Article 13 provides a non-exhaustive list of 
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China’s environmental NGOs face many difficulties. The first one is 
an identity problem; the requirements for official registration are so harsh 
that many NGOs are not formally registered as Non-Profit Organizations 
(NPOs).41 The rest operate under other identities, registering as industry 
and commerce entities, or dependent and unincorporated bodies, or even 
operating as illegal organizations. But even unregistered environmental 
groups still act essentially as NGOs, so the standard of what defines an 
environmental NGO should be based on an organization’s aims concerning 
environmental protection, instead of on their apparent registration 
identities. 
Today Chinese NGOs promote the progress of civil society by playing 
important roles in meeting community needs, helping supervise 
government actions, and promoting democracy-building. In recent years, 
China’s executive and legislative leadership have been trying to promote 
legislation to require NGOs to improve their management systems. Former 
Chinese Civil Affairs Bureau Director Chen Jin Luo led preparation of the 
“experts’ recommended draft on non-profit organization of the PRC.”42 
This draft proposes to lower the threshold for registration of NGOs and to 
relax substantive access restrictions.43 In addition, the Chinese NGO 
experts’ draft also calls for promoting a tax relief system, governmental 
procurement of NGO public services, and other reforms.44 These reforms 
eventually may help remove some of the current confusion over the identity 
of many environmental NGOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
restrictions, stating that “[t]he registration and management agency will not approve the registration 
preparation” if “it can be shown that the objectives and area of work of a social organisation applying 
for the first stage of registration do not comply with Article 4 of these regulations,” if “there is already a 
social organisation active in the same or similar area of work” in the same administrative area, if “the 
persons applying or the intended persons in charge have ever received criminal sanction of being 
deprived of their political rights, or do not possess complete civil liability,” or if “deception is employed 
in the preliminary application.” CHINA DEV. BRIEF, supra note 36. 
 41. Koon-Kwai Wong, Greening of the Chinese Mind: Environmentalism with Chinese 
Characteristics, 12 ASIA-PACIFIC REV. 39, 53 (2006). 
 42. Chen Jin Luo (陈金罗), A Review of 30 Year’s NGO Legislation, PHILANTHROPY TIMES (Oct. 
26, 2010, 9:45AM), http://gongyi.ifeng.com/news/detail_2010_10/26/2899037_0.shtml. 
 43. Id. The revised administrative regulations likely to be adopted by the end of 2013 are expected 
to assist in the registration of hundreds of thousands of NGOs according to Wang Jianjun, director of 
the Bureau of Administration of NGOs under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. New Rules for NGOs on 
Cards, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 19, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2013-
04/19/content_16421841.htm. 
 44. Id. 
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b. China’s Environmental NGOs’ Various Backgrounds and Functions 
 
Environmental NGOs in China can be divided into three general 
categories: (1) officially endorsed NGOs, (2) international NGOs, and (3) 
grassroots NGOs. The NGOs in each of these categories perform different 
functions and face different limitations. 
One successful example of an officially endorsed environmental NGO 
is the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF).45 ACEF is recognized by 
China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection.46 Official backing gives this 
type of NGO incomparable advantages for registration, operation, and 
fundraising.47 The group has very rich resources in official contacts and 
background, influential channels for discovering environmental illegal 
actions, and direct contact with powerful official media.48 ACEF has 
professional expertise in technology and legal services, information 
disclosure, and even litigation.49 However, because of the group’s close 
relationship with the administrative agencies, it generally cannot freely 
criticize nonfeasance by administrative agencies, like many famous foreign 
environmental NGOs. This is significant because in China nonfeasance is a 
prevalent phenomenon among environmental authorities at all levels.50 
International environmental NGOs, like the NRDC and the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), both of which have offices in Beijing, 
benefit from their access to substantial financial support from foreign 
sources.51 According to various sources, people and groups in the United 
States and Canada annually contribute to Chinese NGOs up to U.S. $650 
million, an amount that has been increasing yearly.52 More importantly, 
international NGOs contribute ideas concerning how to advance civil 
 
 45. See generally Introduction, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.acef.com.cn/en/aboutacef/2013/1216/1004.html. 
 46. See Our Advantages, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.acef.com.cn/en/aboutacef/2013/1216/1007.html (highlighting that an advantage of ACEF is 
support from the Ministry of Environmental Protection). 
 47. See ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N, supra note 45. 
 48. See Organizational Structure, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.acef.com.cn/en/aboutacef/2013/1216/1005.html; ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N, supra note 46. 
 49. Xiaoxing Feng, Playing the Role of ENGOs, Improving the Level of Public Participation, and 
Promoting Sustainable Development, ACEF (July 2, 2012), http://www.acef.com.cn 
/news/lhhdt/43973.shtml. 
 50. MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 6; Qie Jianrong (郄建荣), Governments' Nonfeasance is Major 
Source of Environmental Chronic Disease, LEGAL DAILY (Nov. 14, 2011, 7:22 PM), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2011-11/14/content_3091860.htm?node=5955. 
 51. Cf. Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 286 (listing budgets of six well-known international 
NGOs in China, including EDF and NRDC). 
 52. Environmental NGOs: Further Money Pressure Highlighted, CE NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.cenews.com.cn/xwzx/hjyw/201110/t20111014_706797.html. 
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society and they can enlighten China’s NGOs concerning practices that 
originated in the West.53 However, international NGOs in China face one 
major quandary: because of their international character, they face stricter 
supervision and greater restrictions on their activities than they do when 
operating outside of China.54 
China’s grassroots NGOs face challenges because of their small size 
and their difficulties obtaining financing. According to a survey on the 
scale of environmental public interest organizations, Chinese grassroots 
environmental NGOs generally are small with 73% having less than ten 
staff persons, and 41% with less than five staff.55 Chronic funding 
shortages face even some well-known grassroots NGOs.56 This can be 
traced in part to the lack of tax incentives for contributing to nonprofits 
because contributions to charitable organizations are not tax deductible as 
they are in the United States.57 Third, there is a need for capacity-building 
among grassroots NGOs. The professional level of their staff is much lower 
than that of the average international NGO.58 In addition, the distant 
relationship between government and grassroots NGOs often results in a 
lack of institutionalized channels for participating in governmental 
decision-making. However, grassroots NGOs still enjoy public support 
because they are perceived to be more objective as neutral third parties 
monitoring governmental and corporate behavior.59 
 
2. Reasons for the Relative Success of Environmental NGOs in China 
 
Compared with U.S. NGOs, China’s environmental NGOs are still in a 
formative stage and perform more limited functions. But among NGOs in 
 
 53. Ta Kung Pao, China’s Overseas NGOs have Reached more than 4000, Facing Legal 
Embarrassment (June 29, 2012), http://www.dongnanyanet.com/cms/a/kyn/2012/0710/2515.html.  
 54. See Gunter & Rosen, supra note 51, at 279; Carl Minzner, New Chinese Regulations on 
Foundations, 2 INT’L J. CIV. SOC. L. 110, 113–15 (2004). 
 55. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 205. 
 56. See Cai Shouqiu & Wen Lizhao, The Latest Development of Environmental NGOs in China, 4 
INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE ACAD. ENVTL. L.J. 39, 42 (2013). 
 57. Tax benefits are only available to legally-registered NGOs, so many grassroots NGOs that are 
registered as businesses do not benefit. Shawn Shieh, Can Bill Gates and Warren Buffet Start a 
Philanthropic Revolution in China, NGOs In China (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://ngochina.blogspot.com/2010/10/can-bill-gates-and-warren-buffet-start.html; see also Lian Mo, 
Beijing Looks at Laws on Philanthropy, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 3, 2010, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/03/content_11498980.htm. 
 58. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 205. 
 59. See Luna Lin, Government-Backed NGO Under Pressure to Act Against China's Largest Coal 
Miner, CHINA DIALOGUE (July 23, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6227-Government-
backed-NGO-under-pressure-to-act-against-China-s-largest-coal-miner/en. 
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China the functions of environmental NGOs are remarkable and notably 
greater than those enjoyed by other kinds of NGOs. There are three main 
reasons for this difference. 
Theoretically, environmental NGOs create less political sensitivity 
than other NGOs in the view of Chinese government officials. NGOs that 
focus on human rights, labor, and other issues are viewed as potentially 
more threatening by Chinese officials.60 Despite the lack of a “grassroots 
culture” for NGOs, it is widely understood that the Chinese government is 
more tolerant of the existence and development of environmental NGOs 
than NGOs who focus on other issues. 
Environmental NGOs enjoy a warmer relationship with executive 
authorities than other NGOs in China. In recent years, because of a one-
sided emphasis on economic development, China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) has faced incredible difficulties in 
fulfilling its increasing administrative functions.61 Despite the importance 
of MEP’s mission, the agency has faced many barriers to enforcement from 
other central authorities and local governments.62 This has increased the 
need for China’s environmental protection departments to rely more 
heavily on environmental NGOs for support and services. In January 11, 
2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued “guidance on 
cultivation and guide the orderly development of Chinese environmental 
NGOs,” to improve their quality.63 Among the organizations surveyed, 
71% of organizations have received the help and support of the 
government, and these institutions have great expectations for the role of 
government in environmental protection.64 
As noted above, international NGOs have made important 
contributions that have assisted in the development of Chinese 
environmental NGOs.65 These include contributions of funds, human 
resources and assistance with capacity-building for China’s NGOs. 
 
 
 
 
 60. See Wang Fei, Operation and Development Trend of the NGOs of Environmental Protection 
in China, 247 XUE HUI 14 (2009); Chen, supra note 30, at ¶ 6. 
 61. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 204; MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 83. 
 62. Id.; see also MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 104 (describing how administrative rules have “co-
equal status” with local decrees and local rules). 
 63. See Guidance on Cultivation and Guide the Orderly Development of Environmental Guidance, 
MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj 
/201101/t20110128_200347.htm. 
 64. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 203. 
 65. See infra notes 51–54and accompanying text. 
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3. The Principal Functions of Chinese Environmental NGOs 
 
Chinese environmental NGOs have functioned at a much lower level 
than some international NGOs, focusing on tree planting, calling for the 
protection of wild animals, and helping the government to raise public 
awareness of environmental problems.66 Chinese environmental NGOs 
have been less active than international NGOs in promoting environmental 
legislation, enforcement, and participating in the process of regulatory 
development. Even the MEP’s active promotion of environmental NGOs 
would not seem to be enough. Institutional or political reform may be 
needed before Chinese NGOs participate in the legislative and judicial 
processes that shape environmental policy as closely as NGOs do in the 
United States. 
A survey of Chinese environmental NGOs found that such 
organizations typically focus on projects like the following: exchanging 
information, building public awareness, education, sustainable 
development demonstration projects, capacity building, and policy research 
and other means for promoting environmental protection.67 The number of 
environmental organizations that provide legal assistance and that engage 
in policy advocacy is very limited with only 11 organizations engaging in 
these activities.68 This reflects both the limited operational capacity of 
Chinese environmental NGOs, as well as China’s legal and institutional 
environment. China’s legal system is imperfect, especially with respect to 
environmental public interest litigation. The litigation system is not perfect 
and the judiciary is not independent.69 Legal proceedings to protect the 
environment and to vindicate private rights cost too much and achieve too 
little success.70 In addition, due to the lack of institutionalized participation 
in decision-making and ineffective government communication channels, 
grassroots NGOs rarely are involved in government decision-making and 
development planning that may have a significant impact on the 
environment.71 
 
 
 66. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 206. 
 67. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 206. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See e.g., Zhang Chun, Cadmium Pollution in Yunnan Reopens Debate over Public Interest 
Litigation, CHINA DIALOGUE (July 15, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/s 
how/single/en/6206-Cadmium-pollution-in-Yunnan-reopens-debate-over-public-interest-litigation 
(commenting on the inability of environmental NGOs to successfully prosecute alleged violators of 
environmental statutes due to high appraisal costs and ambiguous statutes). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 206–07. 
Percival -Final (Do Not Delete) 7/21/2014  4:28 PM 
Fall 2013]    ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 153 
III.  CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ENACTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEGISLATION 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a broad bipartisan consensus in favor of 
environmental protection led the U.S. Congress to adopt comprehensive 
laws responding to most of the prominent environmental problems of the 
time.72 However, there is now a sharp partisan split in Congress that makes 
it virtually impossible to enact new environmental legislation, shifting 
environmental battles to the agencies and the courts.73 Although the general 
public and regulated industries have little input on the legislative process in 
China, the National People’s Congress (NPC) regularly reaches out to 
prominent academics and gives them the responsibility for drafting new 
legislation with substantial input from affected government agencies. 
Legislative proposals that win the support of the Chinese Communist Party 
routinely are ratified by overwhelming majorities of the NPC when it meets 
each March. 
 
A. United States  
In a remarkable burst of legislative activity between 1970 and 1976 
the U.S. Congress enacted a series of laws requiring the establishment of 
comprehensive regulatory programs to protect the environment. These laws 
include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act. These acts establish a comprehensive regulatory 
infrastructure that seeks to protect the public from environmental harm. 
While various theories have been proposed to explain why Congress was 
able to enact these remarkable laws,74 the early legislation was passed even 
before the new, national environmental groups had developed a significant 
lobbying presence.75 Some observers have even argued that the initial laws 
were particularly stringent because of the absence of unified, national 
groups representing environmental interests that were capable of making 
compromises with business interests in the lobbying process.76 
These laws routinely were expanded and strengthened when 
 
 72. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
92–97 (7th ed. 2013) (chronicling the history of environmental law in the United States during the 
1970s). 
 73. Id. at 100. 
 74. Many of these theories are reviewed in Percival, supra note 20, at 13–15. 
 75.  E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory 
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 338 (1985). 
 76. Id. 
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reauthorized by Congress in the decade that followed. By then both 
industry groups and environmental organizations had developed 
sophisticated lobbying operations to influence Congress.77 Laws to address 
new concerns raised by highly publicized incidents of visible 
environmental harm also were enacted. These included the “Superfund” 
legislation adopted in 1980 after contamination of homes in Love Canal 
from long-buried hazardous wastes, the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act adopted in response to the Bhopal tragedy, 
and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 adopted in response to the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill.78 
Beginning with the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the 
bipartisan consensus in favor of more stringent environmental legislation 
disappeared. As both industry and public interest groups became more 
sophisticated in their efforts to influence legislation it has proven to be 
much easier for either set of interests to block legislation than to win 
enactment of new statutes. Today the U.S. Congress is sharply split on 
issues of environmental regulation.79 The Republican takeover of the U.S. 
House of Representatives in the 2010 elections produced the most anti-
environmental house of Congress in U.S. history. In the 112th Congress 
that met from 2011 through 2012, the Republican-controlled U.S. House of 
Representatives approved more than 300 bills to roll back environmental 
regulations.80 These measures generally did not become law because they 
could not win passage in the U.S. Senate, which is controlled by Democrats 
more sympathetic to environmental regulation. Due to the partisan split in 
the two houses of Congress it has become virtually impossible for Congress 
to enact any new environmental legislation. 
 
B. Public Participation in Legislative Initiatives in China 
Because China has a one-party political system, it has avoided the 
legislative gridlock that has stymied the enactment of new environmental 
legislation in the United States. Under normal circumstances, almost all the 
laws that the Communist Party wants to enact meet little resistance. But 
when new legislation or important development projects are being 
 
 77. Today these lobbying operations are even more sophisticated. See, e.g., Andrew Kreighbaum, 
Oil Spill Bills Stall in Senate as Industry, Environmental Lobbyists Battle, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (Aug. 
23, 2010, 4:35 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/08/post-2.html. 
 78. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 144, 339, 351–52. 
 79. Id. at 100. 
 80. MINORITY STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., THE ANTI-
ENVIRONMENT RECORD OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: FINAL SUMMARY OF THE 2011-
2012, available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Anti-
Environment-Voting-Record-of-112th-Congress-Summary-Final.pdf.. 
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considered, environmental NGOs can find many avenues for influencing 
government decisions. 
 
1. The Relevant Legal Provisions for Initiating Legislation 
 
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Chinese Constitution 
and the “Legislation Law of the PRC,” the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee, the State Council and the Central Military 
Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and a number of its 
representatives have the legal power in China to initiate legislation.81 
China’s administrative legislation and rules are only drafted by the State 
Council. Those ministries and commissions in the State Council that need 
to develop administrative regulations must seek preliminary approval from 
the State Council.82 Thus in China because of the strict legal project 
procedures, theoretically it is impossible for civil society to have a direct 
role in initiating legislative proposals. 
 
2. The Efforts of Chinese Environmental NGOs to Initiate 
Environmental Legislation 
 
China’s environmental NGOs still have some influence on efforts to 
initiate environmental legislation. They can do so in the following ways. 
First, they can appeal for the adoption of necessary environmental 
legislation through their own NGO publications,83 by network platform,84 
 
 81. XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 64, § 1 (2004) (China). See also Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on 
Legislation] art. 12, 13, 24, 25 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 
2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 112 (China), 
translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO. 
31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-
08/20/content_29724.htm. 
82See also Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] art. 57 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. 112 (China), translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF 
THE PRESIDENT NO. 31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm. 
 83. For example, the earliest Chinese environmental NGO “Friends of Nature,” in its annual 
environmental green book, China Environmental Development Report, noted that some important 
national nature reserves in China are facing a crisis and called for the nature reserve law to be enacted 
as soon as possible. Chinese Environmental NGOs are Calling for Legislation to Protect Nature 
Reserves, CHINA NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 19, 2012, 7:57 PM), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/04-
19/3832928.shtml. 
 84. See e.g. Lou Hua et al., E administration Square, WWW.NEWS.CN (May 9, 2009) (in order to 
hear more voices of the masses, people.com.cn in 2009 opened "E square" for Internet users, in order to 
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and by the use of influential media. Second, academics working with the 
environmental NGOs often are asked to help draft legislative proposals or 
specific legislation, which are then are submitted to the NPC through its 
members and the CPPCC.85 If these legislative proposals are approved by 
the Party leadership, they will be adopted much more easily by the National 
People’s Congress than is the case in the U.S. Congress where fierce 
lobbying battles between interest groups are waged. 
 
IV. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
A. United States 
In the U.S. the federal environmental laws and the Administrative 
Procedure Act require agencies to solicit public input before adopting 
regulations.86 Agencies generally must provide the public with notice and 
an opportunity to submit comments prior to adopting any new 
regulations.87 Regulatory targets are intensely interested in forestalling the 
issuance of regulations and reducing the cost of complying with them. 
Thus, during the rulemaking process regulated industries in the U.S. 
fiercely lobby not only the agency conducting the rulemaking, but also the 
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), which is tasked by the President with reviewing and 
approving particularly significant proposed and final regulations.88 While 
public interest groups also participate in this process, their influence more 
often than not is dwarfed by industry lobbying efforts.89 
 
enable the public, Congress representatives, and government officials to exchange views via the 
Internet). Over the past few years "E square" has been the vehicle for the submission of more than 
14,000 recommendations. Another example is that many environmental NGOs called for tobacco 
control legislation in Beijing in 2008 in their own annual symposium. 400 Environmental 
Organizations Calling for Tobacco Control Legislation, BEIJING TIMES (Nov. 1, 2008, 9:51 AM), 
http://news.qq.com/a/20081101/000879.htm. 
 85. Hong Liu, China ENGOs' Participation in Policy Making, 6 FUDAN PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5 
(2010) (discussing some examples of how the members of environmental NGOs used their own status 
as members of the NPC and the CPPCC to put forward the proposals to NPC & CPPCC). 
 86. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 170–71. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 172–74. 
 89. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2011, at A1 (arguing political strategy was behind the White House’s rejection of EPA’s proposed 
smog standard); Haley Sweetland Edwards, He Who Makes the Rules, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar./Apr. 
2013, at 27, (describing how industry lobbying has neutered agencies trying to issue regulations to 
implement the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). But see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1860–63 (2013) (former OIRA administrator arguing that although OIRA meets 
far more frequently with business groups than environmental NGOs its actions vetoing national 
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For NGOs one of the most challenging aspects of the regulatory 
process is the need to convince agencies to focus regulatory attention on a 
particular problem. If environmental legislation requires an agency to 
regulate a particular problem, the federal environmental laws generally 
authorize private parties to bring citizen suits to compel government 
officials to perform duties required by law.90 These provisions were used 
by environmental NGOs to force EPA to issue regulations implementing 
many of the federal laws that required comprehensive regulatory programs 
to protect the environment. As frustration mounted over EPA delays in 
issuing regulations, Congress repeatedly amended the environmental laws 
to establish statutory deadlines for EPA’s issuance of regulations.91 
Because these deadlines are enforceable through citizen suits, they have 
given environmental NGOs new tools for forcing regulatory action. 
In a few instances environmental NGOs in the U.S. also have been 
able to use lawsuits to compel EPA to regulate certain substances or 
practices that were not explicitly subject to regulation in the underlying 
environmental statutes. For example, a Sierra Club lawsuit forced EPA to 
establish a program to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in 
areas currently in attainment for the national ambient air quality 
standards.92 A lawsuit by the NRDC forced EPA to promulgate a national 
ambient air quality standard for lead.93 
But usually it is very difficult to convince an already overburdened 
agency to focus regulatory attention on a particular issue. This is well 
illustrated by the history of NGO efforts to persuade EPA to ban gasoline 
lead additives.94 Tetraethyl lead was invented by chemist Thomas Midgely 
 
environmental regulations had nothing to do with politics). 
 90. RICHARD G. STOLL, EFFECTIVE EPA ADVOCACY: ADVANCING AND PROTECTING YOUR 
CLIENT’S INTERESTS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 15 (2010). 
 91. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 98. 
 92. The Sierra Club successfully argued that the Clean Air Act’s statutory purpose to “protect and 
enhance” air quality created an obligation not only to attain the NAAQS, but also to prevent the 
deterioration of air quality that was presently better than the NAAQS. After the district court decision 
was affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion by the D.C. Circuit, it was then sustained when the 
Supreme Court split 4-4 on the merits. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C. 
1972), aff'd per curiam, 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided court mem. sub nom., 
Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541, 541 (1973). 
 93. The court ruled that because EPA had already made a determination that lead endangered 
public health in order to regulate lead additives in fuel, and because it was indisputable that lead 
satisfied the criteria pollutant standard of being emitted from “numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources,” EPA also had a nondiscretionary duty to declare lead a criteria pollutant and regulate it under 
the provisions of the Act governing those pollutants. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 
322 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 94. The history of NGO efforts to persuade EPA to ban lead additives is reviewed in detail in 
Ellen K. Silbergeld & Robert V. Percival, The Organometals: Impact of Accidental Exposure and 
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in the 1920s as an inexpensive means for boosting gasoline’s octane 
content.95 By the late 1960s Cal Tech scientist Clair Patterson was warning 
that increased use of leaded gasoline was generating dangerously high 
levels of lead in the ambient air and in soil near major highways.96 As 
enacted by Congress in 1970, the Clean Air Act expressly authorized EPA 
to regulate fuel additives that the agency found to endanger public health.97 
Pressed by environmental NGOs to respond to this problem, EPA adopted 
regulations to set an upper limit on the amount of lead additives that 
refiners could use in the total pool of gasoline (leaded and unleaded) that 
they produced.98 
Having made a finding that lead in the ambient air endangered public 
health, EPA was sued by NRDC, which successfully argued that the Clean 
Air Act also required EPA and NRDC to set a national ambient air quality 
standard for lead.99 After EPA’s initial limits on the amount of lead in 
gasoline were struck down by a three-judge panel as based on evidence that 
was “speculative and inconclusive at best,” the U.S. Court of Appeals, by a 
5-4 vote, reversed this decision and upheld EPA’s regulation in a decision 
that represents the U.S. judiciary’s strongest endorsement of precautionary 
regulation.100 
In 1982 the lead in gasoline issue resurfaced when Vice President 
Bush, as head of President Reagan’s Vice Presidential Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief, forced EPA to propose abolishing the very limits on the 
lead content of gasoline that the D.C. Circuit had upheld. NGOs played a 
major role in defeating this initiative.101 The NGOs received surprising 
support from conservative columnist George Will who wrote a column 
entitled “The Poison That Poor Children Breathe,” attacking the 
proposal.102 In a decision upholding EPA’s decision to abandon the 
 
Experimental Data on Regulatory Policies, in NEUROTOXICANTS AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION: 
EFFECTS OF ORGANOHEAVY METALS 328 (Hugh A. Tilson & Sheldon B. Sparber eds., 1987); and Lisa 
Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 160–72 (2005). 
 95. Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, THE NATION (Mar. 20, 2000), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-history-lead?page=0,2. 
 96. Clair Patterson, Contamination and Natural Environments of Man, 11 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 
344 (1965). 
 97. Heinzerling, Ackerman & Massey, supra note 94, at 164. 
 98. Silbergeld & Percival, supra note 94, at 342. 
 99. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 100. See Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
 101. Silbergeld & Percival, supra note 94, at 344–45. 
 102. George Will, The Poison Poor Children Breathe, WASH. POST, Sept.16, 1982, at A23, 
reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 101 (Percival & Alevizatos 
eds., 1997). 
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proposal, but giving small refineries more time to comply with it, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals stated, “the demonstrated connection between gasoline 
lead and blood lead,” and “the demonstrated health effects of blood lead 
levels . . . would justify EPA in banning lead from gasoline entirely.”103 
With the D.C. Circuit having confirmed that a ban on lead in gasoline 
would not encounter legal problems, NGOs then thought strategically 
concerning how to persuade EPA to act. At the time the agency was facing 
deep political problems because cars that were supposed to run on leaded 
gasoline often were being misfueled with the slightly cheaper leaded 
gasoline, destroying their catalytic converters and contributing to an 
unexpected rise in air pollution.104 EPA responded to this problem by 
requiring states to undertake politically unpopular vehicle inspection 
programs. At the same time the Reagan administration’s newly empowered 
Office of Management and Budget was pushing all regulatory agencies to 
base their decisions on cost-benefit analyses.105 One environmental NGO 
pushed EPA to solve the misfueling problem by phasing out gasoline lead 
additives, arguing that a cost-benefit analysis would demonstrate enormous 
net benefits from such action.106 EPA ultimately proposed to phase out 
leaded gasoline toward the end of the Reagan administration, despite the 
President’s ideological opposition to environmental regulation. When 
implemented, this single regulatory action caused massive reductions in 
children’s exposure to lead. It now has been adopted by nearly every 
country in the world.107 
This history demonstrates the power of NGOs thinking strategically 
and seeking alliances even with groups that normally are not proponents of 
environmental protection measures. Lead phasedown is now widely viewed 
as EPA’s most notable environmental achievement.108 Yet then-EPA 
Deputy Administrator Al Alm noted that it was an initiative that came 
about almost by accident “through a ‘chance’ encounter” with someone 
who suggested that EPA do a cost-benefit analysis of a lead phaseout.109 
 
 
 103. Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 705 F.2d 506, 531 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 104. Silbergeld & Percival, supra note 94, at 346. 
 105. Id. at 345. 
 106. Id. at 345–46. 
 107. See Phasing Out Leaded Gasoline, WORSTPOLLUTED.ORG, http://www.worstpolluted.org/pro 
jectsreports/display/66 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
 108. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 33 (citing the financial and health benefits that resulted from the 
EPA’s phasedown of lead additives in gasoline). 
 109. Al Alm, The Multimedia Approach to Pollution Control: An Impossible Dream?, in 
MULTIMEDIA APPROACHES TO POLLUTION CONTROL: A SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 114, 115 (1987). 
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B. Public Participation in the Regulatory Process in China 
In China regulations are issued with little public input by the State 
Council, a body that is considered a separate branch of government under 
the Chinese Constitution. Because Chinese environmental regulations are 
not the product of fierce lobbying and compromise between affected 
interests and regulatory authorities, it seems hardly surprising that they are 
not taken as seriously by the regulated community as in the U.S. 
 
1. Public Participation in Accordance with China’s Administrative 
Regulations 
 
Public participation in the area of administrative regulations means 
systems and mechanisms through which relevant governmental entities 
allow and encourage interested parties and ordinary citizens to share their 
opinions in the process of administrative legislation and decision. These 
opinions are sought to further enhance justice and the rationality of 
administrative actions. In China this is a significant element in efforts to 
promote the rule of law and adherence to law by administrative agencies.110 
To ordinary citizens, public participation is a mechanism of interest 
expression. 
Article 58 of the registration law of PRC provides that “In drafting 
administrative regulations, opinions from relevant organs, organizations 
and citizens shall be widely listened to, and forums, seminars, hearings, etc. 
may be held for the purpose.”111 Thus, gathering of opinions may be in 
various forms such as panel discussions, feasibility study meetings, 
hearings, or other forms.112 
Public participation is increasingly welcomed by the government and 
more frequently mentioned in the documents of the State Council. The 
article of “Guidelines of Comprehensively Promoting Administration by 
Law,” issued by the State Council in 2004, requires improvement in the 
way the public participates in the development of government legislation 
and broader public participation.113 The article of “Opinions on 
 
 110. The Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 31 of 
the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), Article 1, 58, 
translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO. 
31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), available at 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Guidelines of Comprehensively Promoting Administration by Law, STATE COUNCIL (Aug. 31, 
2006), http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxz/content_374160.htm (announcing that part 5 and other articles 
require improvement in the way the public participates in the development of government legislation 
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Strengthening the Establishment of Government by Law issued by the State 
Council” in 2010, emphasizes that government legislation should strictly 
comply with legal jurisdiction and procedures.114 It also requires 
improvements in the systems and mechanisms of public participation to 
guarantee that public opinions can be fully expressed and that legitimate 
rights can be fully realized.115 
 
2. Practices by the Public, Especially Environmental NGOs 
 
Compared with the development of legislative initiatives, 
environmental NGOs have more opportunities to participate in the 
implementation of legislation because of legal guarantees. But to make the 
public voice heard in the NPC, contacting representatives is not the only 
way. Environmental NGOs can seek to influence legislation by promoting 
their ideas concerning specific legislation,116 by encouraging public 
response to the call from the MEP or other legislative and administrative 
entities,117 and by using both platforms of official bureaus and civic society 
themselves.118 
 
3. Strong Public Dissatisfaction with Environmental Conditions and 
Efforts to Improve Current Regulations 
 
During the meeting of the NPC and CPPCC in Beijing in early 2013, 
rare dissent surfaced when the NPC elected the members of the NPC’s 
 
and broader public participation). 
 114. Opinions on Strengthening the Establishment of Government by Law, STATE COUNCIL (2010) 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2010/content_1745842.htm (announcing that part 4 and other 
articles emphasize that government legislation should strictly comply with legal jurisdiction and 
procedures). 
 115. The Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 31 of 
the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), Article 5, 
translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO. 
31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), available at 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm. 
 116. For example, many NGOs proposed regulatory initiatives and some directly put forward 
detailed drafts of laws. During the modification of the civil procedure law of PRC, “numerous 
environmental organizations and individual citizens . . . submitted their views.” The Top Ten Events of 
Public Participation in Environmental Protection in 2012, CPPCC (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://cppcc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0418/c34948-21177179.html. See also Christine Xu, Didn’t Think 
China had Bottom-Up Activism? Think Again, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 8, 2013), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/cxu/didnt_think_china_had_bottom-u.html. 
 117. CPPCC, supra note 116. 
 118. Id. 
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Environmental and Resources Protection Committee.119 Up to 850 
representatives voted “no”, which means that one-third of the total 
representatives refused to vote for them, considering the 125 who refused 
to vote.120 The voting results astonished the representatives in the Great 
Hall and also drew accolades from some media. This unusual level of 
dissent reflected dissatisfaction of people from all walks of life in China. It 
can be predicted that in the future the public, especially organized NGOs, 
will play a larger role in initiating environmental legislation. 
Although no relevant regulations can be found on public participation 
in legislative initiatives at the national legislative level, there have been 
some breakthroughs in recent years at the local level. For example, in 2006 
the Guangzhou Municipal Government enacted the “Measure of the Public 
Participation in Legislation of Regulations in Guangzhou” (“the Measure”) 
that became effective from January 1, 2007.121 Few particular local 
governmental regulations address public participation in administrative 
legislation.122 In 2012 the Guangzhou Municipal Government amended the 
Measure to improve the procedures for public participation.123 The Measure 
has 37 articles in five chapters, mainly addressing public participation in 
regulation drafting, examination, and execution.124 
Though few local governmental regulations in China regulate public 
participation in administrative legislation, many other local governments 
also have relevant procedures for public participation in drafting local 
regulations. For example, the “Regulations of Hunan Administration 
Procedures (2008)” fully reflect that government’s arrangement regarding 
public participation in regulatory decisions.125 Currently, 29 provincial-
level governments will collect opinions openly before drafting local 
 
 119. Li Jing & Verna Yu, New Environmental Team Booed Amid Pollution Woes, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Mar. 17, 2013, 5:59 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1192581/new-
environmental-team-booed-amid-pollution-woes. 
 120. Id. 
 121. The Measures of the Public Participation in Legislation of Regulations in Guangzhou, LEGAL 
EDUC. NETWORK (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/1200a21752aaaa2010/ 
20101223wangyo14144.shtml. See also Guangzhou Municipal Measures on Public Participation in 
Formulating Rules (promulgated by the Guangzhou Municipal Government Standing Committee, June 
27, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China). 
 122. During the writing of this paper, another provincial level regulation named “Public 
participation in formulating local regulations” was issued by Gansu province on July 26, 2013, effective 
October 1, 2013. See Gansu Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee Notice, CPC NEWS 
(Oct. 4, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1004/c64387-23104941.html. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125.  Hunan Provincial Procedure Provisions (promulgated by the Hunan Provincial People’s 
Government, Apr. 9, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2008) (China). 
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regulations and rules.126 A total of 18 provinces, cities, and autonomous 
regions, including Beijing and Tianjin, have regulations on collecting 
opinions openly and holding hearings relating to provincial-level 
regulations when drafting local regulations and rules.127 At the same time 
the other 11 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions have relevant 
regulations in the form of regulative documents, working rules of legal 
offices or systems approved by provincial governments.128 Systems 
supporting public participation in local administrative legislation are 
gradually taking form.129 
Conceptually, issues regarding NGO organization and public 
participation in the regulatory process are no longer obstacles. However, 
much still must be done to improve public participation including: (1) 
broadening participation in national-level and local rulemaking to establish 
more specific regulations, (2) reducing excessive formalism, which is a 
serious problem in many kinds of public decisions and which reduces the 
effectiveness of public participation, requiring a more reasonable design of 
the system, (3) more professional training of NGO representatives to 
improve their organization’s ability to influence regulatory decisions, and 
(4) greater sincerity in implementing the relevant systems by administrators 
and legislators at all levels.130 
 
V.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
 
Virtually every significant environmental regulation promulgated in 
the U.S. is challenged in court by the regulated industry and/or 
environmental interests. With gridlock in Congress precluding the 
enactment of new environmental legislation, the judiciary has become a 
more important battleground between regulatory targets and the 
beneficiaries of regulation. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has 
instructed lower courts to defer to decisions by executive agencies 
interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions,131 some agencies and some 
 
 126. Hong Zhang (张红), Public Participation in Administrative Legislation: Institutional 
Innovation and Prospects, ADMIN. REFORM (July 20, 2011, 9:08 AM), 
http://www.cntheory.com/news/Dshclsfb/2011/720/117209812K244BBI183BC1C5HE6G6.html. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Feilong Tian, Public Participation: From The System Principle to the System Details (Mar. 
25, 2013), http://www.publiclaw.cn/article/Details.asp?NewsId=4224&classid=22&classname=公民参
与立法. 
 131. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
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types of regulation seem to receive more deference than others.132 The 
judiciary also has used doctrines of standing to make it more difficult for 
NGOs to challenge certain types of agency actions.133 By contrast, the 
Chinese judiciary plays virtually no role in influencing agency decisions 
because regulations issued by the State Council generally are not subject to 
judicial review.134 
 
A. United States 
The judicial system has played an important role in developing U.S. 
environmental policy through judicial review of agency regulatory 
decisions. The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the federal 
environmental statutes generally authorize judicial review of agency action 
at the behest of anyone adversely affected by it.135 As adopted in 1946, the 
APA was a compromise that sought to balance the interests of the public in 
effective regulation with those of the regulated community by making it 
easier for agencies to issue regulations while providing greater access to 
judicial review as a check on agency action.136 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to defer 
to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulatory statutes,137 significant 
regulatory initiatives have been derailed by the courts. Despite 
overwhelming proof of harm to health caused by tobacco products, when 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sought to regulate them 
stringently, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, rejected the agency’s 
finding that cigarettes were “drug delivery devices” for nicotine that could 
be regulated by the agency.138 
In 1989, after a decade-long investigation, EPA issued a regulation 
phasing out nearly all remaining uses of asbestos.139 The agency concluded 
 
 132. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 761, 796–97 (2008); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 183–84 (2010). 
 133. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 134. RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL 
AMBIVALENCE 212 (Chris Arup et al. eds., 2013). 
 135. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
 136. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 180 (1999). 
 137. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 138.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131, 160–61 (2000) (“Congress 
has directly spoken to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco products.”). 
 139. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 
54 Fed. Reg. 29, 460 (July 12, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763). 
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that only a phaseout “will adequately control” the life cycle of asbestos 
exposure risks that occur whenever the substance is mined, used in 
manufacturing, released into the environment through deteriorating 
asbestos-containing products, or is disposed.140 Despite the well-
documented dangers of asbestos, this regulation was struck down by a 
reviewing court which concluded that the agency had failed to perform 
sufficiently detailed cost-benefit analyses of banning not only each 
particular use of asbestos, but also of all intermediate alternatives short of a 
ban.141 The court required such highly detailed proof, on a product-by-
product basis, that benefits outweighed costs, as to render the Toxic 
Substances Control Act virtually impotent as a regulatory tool.142 
Despite some judicial reversals of important regulatory initiatives, the 
regulatory infrastructure of U.S. environmental law generally has survived 
persistent legal attacks.  In 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected an industry argument that unless the Clean Air Act was interpreted 
to require that regulations be based on cost-benefit analyses it would be an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive.143 In 
2007 the Court, by a 5-4 vote in Massachusetts v. EPA, ordered EPA to 
reconsider its refusal to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as 
arbitrary and capricious.144 As a result of this decision, the EPA was able to 
promulgate regulations controlling GHG emissions under the existing 
Clean Air Act, even though efforts to enact new legislation establishing a 
comprehensive cap-and-trade program had failed. In June 2012 a panel of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously rejected all 
industry challenges to these regulations in a decision deferring to EPA’s 
findings concerning the contribution of GHG emissions to global warming 
and climate change.145 
 
B. China 
Chinese law does not authorize private parties to seek judicial review 
 
 140.  Id. at 29,468. 
 141. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(“[EPA’s] explicit failure to consider the alternatives required of it by Congress deprived its final rule 
of the reasonable basis it needed to survive judicial scrutiny.”). 
 142. See id. While the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision effectively precluded EPA from banning 
existing uses of asbestos, most other developed countries have done so, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has upheld such bans in light of the demonstrated dangers of asbestos. E.g., 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 192(b), WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
 143. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 458, 475–76 (2001). 
 144. Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
 145. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
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of regulatory decisions by the State Council. In 2003 two judges in Henan 
province were fired as a result of a decision that struck down a provincial 
regulation as inconsistent with national law.146 This received national 
attention in China, providing a strong signal to other judges that aggressive 
judicial review was unwelcome in China. 
 
VI.  ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND CITIZEN SUITS 
 
In the U.S., environmental enforcement relies heavily on self-
monitoring by regulated industries, supplemented by government 
inspections. But nearly all the federal environmental laws provide for 
citizen suits that can be brought either against government agencies who 
fail to perform non-discretionary duties, such as meeting statutory 
deadlines for issuing regulations, or against polluters who violate their 
permits.147 As noted above, citizen suits against government officials 
initially played a key role in forcing U.S. agencies to issue regulations to 
implement the environmental laws. However, except in Clean Water Act 
cases they have not been used frequently to enforce the environmental laws 
against polluters because of the difficulty of proving violations. 
Despite determination at the national level to upgrade environmental 
performance, Chinese officials have had a difficult time enforcing their 
environmental laws because their legal system is so decentralized with 
local environmental protection boards having most of the enforcement 
power.148 China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection has only 300 
employees (compared to 17,000 employees at the U.S. EPA) and it 
regularly loses bureaucratic battles to the powerful National Development 
and Reform Commission.149 Chinese environmental laws do not expressly 
provide for citizen suits, though determined public interest lawyers still are 
bringing lawsuits asking courts to stop pollution and to compensate 
victims. The creation of environmental courts in some Chinese provinces 
and legal reforms to facilitate class actions ultimately may make such 
lawsuits easier to win.  But Chinese courts remain beholden to the wishes 
of the Communist Party and routinely refuse to hear cases that the Party 
does not want to be heard. This is illustrated by the refusal of Chinese 
 
 146. STERN, supra note 134, at 212. 
 147. See PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1122–23. 
 148. MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 5. 
 149. Id. at 84; How Many People Work for the EPA?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://publicaccess.supportportal.com/link/portal/23002/23012/Article/17588/How-many-people-work-
for-the-EPA (last modified May 7, 2013). 
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courts to hear lawsuits by fishermen harmed by the Bohai Bay oil spill.150 
 
A. United States 
In the U.S., government enforcement authorities rely heavily on self-
monitoring and self-reporting requirements to detect violations of the 
environmental laws. The pollution control statutes generally authorize EPA 
to impose monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements on 
dischargers.151 Under the Clean Water Act, dischargers of water pollutants 
are required to monitor their discharges on a regular basis and to file 
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) that are available to the public. When 
self-reported violations are included in DMRs, it is relatively easy for 
regulatory authorities or citizen groups to bring successful enforcement 
actions. Recognizing the danger that sources will not report adverse 
monitoring data truthfully, regulatory authorities prosecute reporting 
violations with vigor. When false reporting or tampering with monitoring 
data has been discovered, criminal prosecutions often follow. To make it 
possible to uncover false reports, the environmental laws generally give 
enforcement officials the right to conduct inspections.152 
Recognizing that federal agencies had a long history of 
unresponsiveness to environmental concerns, Congress sought to enlist 
citizens in the tasks of ensuring that the laws were implemented and 
enforced properly. It did so by authorizing citizen suits, a major innovation 
first incorporated in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970153and included 
in virtually all the major environmental laws Congress subsequently 
adopted.154 These provisions generally allow citizens to act as “private 
attorney generals” to supplement government enforcement against those 
who violate environmental regulations.155 They “generally authorize ‘any 
person’ to commence an action against ‘any person’ alleged to be in 
violation of the laws.”156 These citizen suit provisions require citizens to 
 
 150. 500 Fishermen of Shandong Claimed Against Conoco Phillips, a U.S. Court Hearing, CHINA 
NETWORK (Apr. 3, 2013), http://news.china.com.cn/live/2013-04/03/content_19360353.htm; Gong Jing 
& Cui Zheng, The Dark Patch on Bohai Bay, CHINA-WIRE (Dec. 26, 2011), http://china-
wire.org/?p=17854. 
 151. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318–19 (2006). 
 152. ENVTL. LAW INST., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO USING FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS TO 
SECURE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 22–23 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance 
/ej/resources/reports/annual-project-reports/citizen_guide_ej.pdf. 
 153. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
 154. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006), Water Act and Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006). 
 155. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1123. 
 156. Id. 
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notify the alleged violator and federal and state authorities prior to filing 
suit. Sixty days’ notice usually is required, although the amount of notice 
can vary for certain violations.157 The citizen suit provisions usually specify 
that if federal or state authorities are diligently prosecuting an action to 
require compliance, filing of a citizen suit is barred, though citizens are 
authorized to intervene in federal enforcement actions as of right.158 
Citizen enforcement actions against private parties who violated 
environmental regulations were rarely filed during the 1970s. This changed 
in 1982 due to concern over a dramatic decline in governmental 
enforcement efforts during the early years of the Reagan administration. 
The NRDC “initiated a national project to use citizen suits to fill the 
enforcement void.”159 NRDC’s project focused on enforcement of the 
Clean Water Act because it was easy to prove violations of this Act through 
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) filed by polluters.160 These reports 
are “available to the public and can serve as prima facie evidence of 
NPDES permit violations.”161 Joined by local environmental groups, 
NRDC systematically scrutinized DMRs, sent 60-day notice letters to 
dischargers who reported violations of permit limits, and then filed citizen 
suits. As a result of this project, the total number of citizen suits brought 
under the Clean Water Act increased from six in 1981 to 62 in 1983, 
surpassing the 56 Clean Water Act cases referred by EPA to the Justice 
Department for prosecution that year.162 
Citizen suits became relatively easy to win because of the self-
reported violations contained in the DMRs.  Several courts rejected efforts 
to create new defenses to such suits (including claims that discharge 
monitoring reports prepared by defendants were too unreliable to serve as 
the basis for violations or that they violated the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination).163 Dischargers protested vehemently (the 
general counsel of the Chemical Manufacturers Association complained 
that his members never would have agreed to more aggressive permit 
 
 157. For example, section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act (officially codified as 33 U.S.C. § 
1365(b)(2) (2006)) authorizes suits alleging violations of NSPS requirements or toxic effluent standards 
to be brought immediately after notice, as does section 7002(b)(1)(A) of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) (officially codified as 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (2006)) for violations of RCRA 
subtitle C. 
 158. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). 
 159. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1130. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part III, 14 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,407, 10,424 (1984). 
 163. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1131. 
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provisions if they had known that their permits were going to be enforced), 
In 1984 EPA commissioned a comprehensive study of citizen suits.164 The 
study found that citizen suits had been operating in a manner generally 
consistent with the goals of the environmental statutes by both stimulating 
and supplementing government enforcement.165 The study rejected the 
notion that citizen suits had interfered with government enforcement efforts 
or that they had focused on trivial violations.166 
 
B. China 
 
1. NGOs’ Non-Litigation Roles in Environmental Enforcement 
 
NGOs can play a role in the implementation and enforcement of 
Chinese environmental law. The implementation of law by Chinese NGOs 
can be divided into two parts: litigating on behalf of the public after an 
environmental incident and efforts to enforce the environmental laws 
during administrative processes. The latter mainly includes supervision of 
the implementation of the government’s environmental policies and 
promoting corporate responsibility. 
As social organizations, environmental NGOs can develop their own 
proposals and views to some extent, and express their opinions during the 
administrative process. Efforts to influence public opinion are the most 
common strategy employed by Chinese environmental NGOs. For 
example, in 2003 Chinese NGOs effectively organized public opposition to 
a proposal by a state-owned corporation to build 13 dams on the Nu River. 
As a result of widespread protests, the project was suspended by then-
Premier Wen Jiabao in 2004. In 2012 Chinese NGOs succeeded in bringing 
several construction projects to a halt for failure to comply with 
environmental impact assessment requirements.”167 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. ENVTL. LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES, at v, ix (1984). 
 166. Other studies of the impact of citizen suit provisions in the environmental laws were presented 
in April 2003 at a symposium at Widener University School of Law. The symposium on 
“Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirty something: A Celebration & Summit” featured leading figures in 
the citizen suit movement who discussed its history and current status. See e.g. Karl S. Coplan, Is 
Citizen Suit Notice Jurisdictional and Why Does it Matter?, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 49 (2003); James R. 
May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003); 
Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent Prosecution” Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 63 (2003). 
 167. The Top Ten Events of Public Participation in Environmental Protection in 2012, supra note 
116. For a description of the environmental impact assessment process for construction, see MCELWEE, 
supra note 4, at 130. 
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In 2012, pervasive environmental pollution and food safety problems 
drew more and more attention to heavy metal in the soil, PM2.5 in the air, 
unsafe drinking water, and invisible nuclear radiation. Gathering and 
publishing environmental data through mobile devices has become a new 
way for the public to participate in environmental protection.168 Monitoring 
activities by private parties have been inspired by greater public concern 
over the quality of the living environment. These activities also can be seen 
as a way to spur professional institutions and government officials to 
disclose information and to take positive measures to protect the 
environment. These activities enhance the public’s enthusiasm for 
participation in environmental protection. Environmental monitoring 
activities are listed among the top ten elements of the public’s participation 
in environmental protection.169 
Another clear trend in China is that environmental NGOs are starting 
to take on some governance roles that originally belonged to the 
government by helping to monitor compliance with environmental 
regulations.170 This could mean that the government may relinquish some 
environmental management functions that could be performed by NGOs. 
As the government begins to cede some of its role to the NGOs, the 
government can focus more on macroeconomic regulation and general 
control, eventually enlisting NGOs to be a de facto constraint on executive 
power. 
The All China Environmental Federation (ACEF), a government-
endorsed NGO, is a social organization that can play an important role in 
monitoring official action to ensure that the government performs its 
responsibility to protect the environment. After ACEF receives 
environmental complaints, it can conduct an on-the-spot investigation and 
use media exposure to publicize environmental problems.171 ACEF then 
can send a proposal letter to the relevant administrative department 
responsible for protecting the environment. Using these methods, ACEF 
has responded effectively to 16 cases of pollution problems, promoting 
local government administration according to law, and supervising 
polluting enterprises to eliminate the pollution problem and maintain public 
environmental rights and interests.172 
ACEF has played a very useful role in promoting compliance with 
environmental regulations. Cases it has handled often are publicized in 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Introduction, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N, supra note 45. 
 172. Id. 
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media reports by the Xinhua News Agency or CCTV. ACEF’s lawyers 
wrote to China’s top leaders to get attention from all levels of the 
government.173 ACEF is particularly valuable because its members know 
China’s national conditions deeply, and they can find the most workable 
methods for resolving pollution disputes through monitoring and site 
investigation that then are reported by media and to officials.174 
 
 2. NGOs’ Roles in Bringing Citizen Suits—ACEF’s Recent Attempt 
 
a. In China Only ACEF is Active in Bringing Public Interests Suits 
 
ACEF’s achievements on citizen suits are remarkable. As a civil 
society organization, ACEF brought and won a lawsuit against Xiuwen 
County Environmental Protection Bureau for malfeasance in failing to 
provide environmental information to the public.175 ACEF completed the 
nation’s first public environmental interest litigation with a social 
organization as plaintiff.176 It brought a lawsuit against Dingpa Paper Mill 
of Wudang district of Huiyang and eventually won the case.177 In these 
proceedings, ACEF’s strategy employed some legal innovations, including 
bringing the litigation in the special court of environmental protection, 
preserving evidence, using professional people’s jurors, and having 
litigation costs borne by the defendant for the first time in an environmental 
case.178 
 
b. Legislation to Facilitate Environmental Public Interest Litigation 
 
For many reasons, it is very difficult to bring public interest litigation 
in China. An important source of this difficulty is standing requirements for 
plaintiffs. The standing requirements of traditional civil law were too strict, 
requiring that only the direct victim can bring a lawsuit.179 At the end of 
2012 the Civil Procedure Law was amended to provide for a system of 
public interest litigation by modifying the provisions of Article 55.180 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Briefing on Environmental Rights Services for the Public in 2011, ACEF (Feb. 13, 2012, 
11:22 AM), http://gongyi.163.com/12/0213/11/7Q504CLB00933KC8.html. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. STERN, supra note 134, at 47.  
 180. Sheng Zhang, Legislative Development in China in 2012, CHINESE J. COMP. L., Dec. 2010, at 
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Relevant bodies and organizations prescribed by the law may now bring a 
suit to the People’s Court against such acts as environmental pollution, 
harm to the consumer’s legitimate interests and rights, and other acts that 
undermine the social and public interest. The environmental NGOs’ 
standing to bring environmental public interest litigation has been 
confirmed. Yet unfortunately individuals are not expressly authorized to 
bring public interest litigation under these amendments, even though much 
of China’s environmental public interest litigation has been brought on 
behalf of private citizens.181 
Because ACEF has the endorsement of the Chinese government182 and 
employs lawyers with a fairly strong technical and legal background, it has 
had greater success in bringing environmental public interest litigation than 
any other NGO in China.183 However, the recent draft revisions of China’s 
environmental protection law have placed ACEF in an awkward position. 
On June 26th, 2013, draft amendments to the Environmental Protection Law 
were submitted to the NPC Standing Committee meeting for secondary 
consideration.184 Among these amendments, one draft article caused heated 
debate: “For the actions of environmental pollution, or ecological damage, 
which harm public interests, All-China Environment Federation and this 
organization established in the provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities, can bring a suit to a people’s court.”185 Many professionals 
questioned this amendment because it would effectively give ACEF a 
monopoly over environmental public interest litigation. They argued that 
this was contrary to the intent of the amendment of Civil Procedural Law in 
2012. After that amendment, § 55 provides that “Legally designated 
institutions and relevant organizations may initiate proceedings at the 
competent people’s court . . . .”186 
While puzzling to most observers, the draft amendment to narrow 
standing to bring public interest environmental litigation may have been 
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 181. Announcement of China Top Ten Public Interest Litigation in 2012 (Jan. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.legalweekly.cn/index.php/Index/article/id/2000. 
 182. The majority of the ACEF leadership are retired senior government officials. See The Chinese 
ACEF is Hard on Behalf of the Public Interest, NANDU (June 27, 2013), 
http://nandu.oeeee.com/nis/201306/27/71505.html. 
 183. Briefing on Environmental Rights Services for the Public in 2011, supra note 176. 
 184. Environmental Protection Amendment Act Provisions, NPC (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2013-07/17/content_1801189.htm. 
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 186. XX (XX) [Laws of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) P.R.C. LAWS (China).  CHINA AMENDS 
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caused by the following. First, because public interest litigation is difficult, 
the drafters of the amendment may have thought that many other 
organizations’ “capacities are too shabby.”187 Secondly, some officials are 
concerned about the potential for abuse of public interest litigation.188 Thus, 
they are very cautious about expanding the parties that could bring such 
cases for fear that it might substantially increase the amount of such 
litigation. 
It is possible that the drafters of the amendment confounded 
distinctions between the right to litigate and the capacity to handle 
litigation. Those bringing China’s rare environmental public interest cases 
face the depressing reality that courts frequently reject environmental 
complaints. This could be a much more serious barrier than their 
organization’s capacity to handle litigation. Indeed, three public interest 
lawsuits brought by ACEF in 2013 were all rejected by courts instead of 
being decided on the merits.189 Officials also may be overanxious because 
public interest litigation may encourage tougher enforcement action than 
they believe is desirable. The complexities of environmental litigation, 
limited judicial expertise, scant resources to pay public interest lawyers, 
and other problems make any surge in environmental public litigations 
almost impossible in the short term. 
It was anticipated that the amendments to the Civil Procedure Law 
would expand organizational standing to bring public interest litigation 
beyond what is allowed in the U.S.  However, the draft amendments to the 
Environmental Law that would allow only ACEF to bring such lawsuits 
would greatly limit such lawsuits. Thus, they ignited a storm of controversy 
and it was widely expected that the draft would be changed.190 China’s 
environmental movement is increasing in importance throughout the 
country and broadening standing and the right to bring actions to other 
NGOs is widely viewed as a vital step towards increasing public 
participation.191 
 
 187. Song Yangbiao, Not Single Running, Not Let Go Boldly, TIME WEEKLY, 
http://www.dooland.com/magazine/article_287053.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
 188. Environmental Public Interest Litigation Should be Filed by ACEF, THE BEIJING NEWS, June 
27, 2013, at A8, available at http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-06/27/content_443459.htm?div=-
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 189. Qie Jianrong (郄建荣), Lack of Judicial Interpretation, The New Civil Procedure Facing 
Embarrassments, LEGAL DAILY, June 20, 2013, at 6. 
 190. During a meeting with Professor Percival in Beijing in August 2013, top officials of ACEF 
expressed embarrassment at the draft amendment and emphasized that they had not sought it and did 
not believe that they should be given a monopoly over public interest environmental litigation. 
 191. Wang Dianxue, Environmental Public Interest Litigation Brought by the All-China 
Environment Federation "Exclusively"?, S. METRO. DAILY, June 27, 2013, at A5. 
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On October 21, 2013, a reporter learned that a third, revised draft of 
amendments to the Environmental Protection Law had been submitted to 
the National People’s Congress committee. The revised draft contains three 
conditions for bringing public interest environmental litigation. First, the 
qualified organization must be registered with the civil affairs department 
under the State Council. Second, it must have specialized in environmental 
protection public activities for more than five consecutive years. Third, it 
must have a good reputation.192 One insider who worked on the revisions 
stated that, with these conditions, the number of qualified organizations in 
China that could bring public interest litigation would be less than ten. 
Because it is very difficult for civil society organizations to be registered 
with the civil affairs department, these conditions still will be very harsh 
for grass-root environmental NGOs.193 
 
3. China’s Environmental Protests and the “NIMBY Movement” 
 
In July 2012, in Shifang, Sichuan Province, the public’s fear of 
pollution from a molybdenum-copper project gradually evolved into 
protests.194 During the same month, in Qidong, in Jiangsu Province people 
were worried that Japan’s oji paper group project would affect the sea 
ecosystem and inshore aquaculture.195 Tens of thousands of citizens rallied 
to demonstrate against the project. In October 2012, in Ningbo,Zhejiang 
Province, there were large-scale protests against expansion of a PX 
(paraxylene) chemical plant. In these cases, public opposition has led to the 
projects being suspended or relocated.196 
In May 2011, in Guizhou,Qingzhen Province,a director of a roofing 
waterproof glue factory, named Long Xingguang, poured eight tons of 
toxic chemical waste in liquid form into sewage.197 After prosecution, Long 
Xingguang was sentenced to prison for two and a half years.198 Cai 
Changhai, leader of the public environmental education center in Guiyang, 
then brought a civil action in his own name to require Long to provide 
1.073 million yuan as compensation for the pollution.199 He claimed the 
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right to seek compensation for harm caused by the pollution to the East 
Gate River within the jurisdiction of the Qingzhen municipality.200 The 
court accepted this lawsuit, indicating the power of public controversy to 
increase the willingness of courts to accept cases.201 
 
VII. NGOS AND TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES 
 
In the U.S., the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know 
Act (EPCRA) requires annual disclosures of toxic releases by most large 
companies that must be made available to the public in a Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI).202 U.S. NGOs have used this information to pressure 
companies to reduce such releases. Chinese NGOs, led by Goldman 
Environmental Prize winner Ma Jun’s Institute for Public and 
Environmental Affairs (IPE), have conducted labor and environmental 
compliance audits of the Chinese supply chains of multinational electronics 
companies.203 By publicizing the results of these audits, these NGOs have 
persuaded Apple and Hewlett Packard to agree to regular audits by 
independent entities.204 In partnership with the NRDC, these NGOs also 
have released annual ratings of how well Chinese municipalities are 
implementing the provisions of the 2008 Open Information Law, which 
mimics the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.205 This creative strategy has 
helped provide incentives for local officials to take the law more seriously. 
Increasing protests over environmental conditions by the Chinese public 
have improved prospects for China adopting some form of a pollution 
release and transfer registry like the U.S. TRI.206 
 
A. United States 
In December 1984 an accidental release of methyl isocynate at a 
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chemical plant owned by the Union Carbide Corporation in Bhopal, India 
killed more than 3,000 people and severely injured of thousands of 
others.207 Congress ultimately responded not by enacting new controls on 
toxic emissions, but rather by adopting legislation requiring comprehensive 
emergency planning and the reporting of chemical releases.208 This 
legislation is known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).209 It requires companies to file annual reports 
disclosing their releases of hundreds of toxic chemicals.210 This data must 
be made available to the public in what has come to be known as the 
Toxics Release Inventory. 
When the first TRI was released, EPA officials were shocked by the 
large volume of reported releases.211 Community organizations and 
environmental groups used the data to support calls for stronger regulation. 
During the first week after the TRI became available through the National 
Library of Medicine, the Library received 225 requests for subscriptions, 
most from community groups and ordinary citizens.212 On August 1, 1989, 
USA Today published a two-page list of “The Toxic 500,” the U.S. counties 
with the most pollution from industrial chemicals as reported in the TRI.213 
The National Wildlife Federation published a book identifying the 500 
largest dischargers, who released more than 7.5 billion pounds of toxics, 
including 39 known or probable carcinogens.214 NRDC used the data to 
prepare “A Who’s Who of American Toxic Air Polluters,” identifying 
more than 1,500 major sources of toxic air emissions.215 Subsequent 
updates of the TRI have continued to receive wide publicity and many 
community groups have used the TRI to issue reports publicizing local 
polluters. The EDF created an interactive pollution locator that used TRI 
data to permit individuals to obtain information on the Internet about 
sources of pollution in their communities.216 By entering their zip code, 
individuals could find out what chemicals were released by which sources 
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in their neighborhoods, information about what is known concerning the 
potential health effects of the chemicals, and how the emissions rank 
relative to facilities in other parts of the country. By clicking on a link on 
the website, citizens could send free faxes complaining about the emissions 
to facilities whose releases were among the highest 20% in the nation. 
The TRI has proven invaluable in providing information to inform 
public policy and public debate over those policies. For instance, Congress 
relied heavily on TRI data in specifying the 189 toxic chemicals required to 
be regulated as hazardous air pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.217 EPA has used the TRI as the cornerstone of its pollution 
prevention strategy and as a means for improving the effectiveness of 
existing regulatory programs.218 TRI data has also figured prominently in 
debates over environmental justice, helping researchers employ an array of 
tools to identify the extent to which environmental exposures may be 
visited in a disproportionate fashion on certain segments of the 
population.219 
TRI backers believed that providing information about toxics releases 
from facilities to the communities nearby those facilities would prompt 
firms to change their behavior in ways that reduced the amount of those 
releases. The evidence to date bears out this expectation. Following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment 
Plant that serves Washington, D.C. discontinued its use of liquid chlorine 
that had been stored in 90-ton tanker cars at its plant located only four 
miles from the U.S. Capitol. This action was taken after the TRI revealed 
the storage of this highly dangerous chemical in tanker cars that, if 
ruptured, could quickly spread a toxic cloud killing thousands of people 
within a 10-mile radius.220 Some environmental groups are citing terrorism 
concerns as further justification to push industry to shift production 
processes to use inherently safer chemicals. 
 
 
 
B. China’s Outstanding Breakthrough on Transparency of Information 
 
1. Information Disclosure Strategies by Chinese NGOs 
 
 217. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 341. 
 218. Id, at 341–42. 
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Two innovative strategies employed by Chinese NGOs focus on 
information disclosure. First, working with NRDC’s Beijing office, IPE in 
Beijing has released annual rankings of how well officials in 113 Chinese 
cities are implementing China’s Open Information Law.221 The rankings, 
which have been released over the last four years, are called the Pollution 
Information and Transparency Index (PITI). Data from the fourth PITI 
report, which covers 2012, showed improvement in the average 
performance of officials in these cities, particularly in top performing 
cities.222 However, the report also found that some cities regressed and 
others still provided almost no environmental information.223 The principal 
problem areas seem to be disclosure of environmental impact assessments, 
information concerning environmental violations, and emissions data. The 
report calls for public disclosure on online monitoring data from key 
polluters, comprehensive disclosure of government supervisory and 
enforcement data, and periodic publication of emissions data for pollutants 
covered by environmental impact assessments.224 
Ma Jun’s IPE also worked with more than 20 other NGOs to audit 
companies in the Chinese supply chains of multinational electronics 
companies. Reports prepared by this NGO coalition harshly criticized 
companies like Apple for using suppliers that regularly violated Chinese 
labor and environmental laws.225 As a result of these reports, Apple joined 
the Fair Labor Association and hired independent auditors to perform 
regular audits of its supply chain.226 These audits already are having an 
impact as Apple has taken actions to discipline suppliers who fail to 
comply with these laws, as documented in the company’s annual Apple 
Supplier Responsibility report that discloses the results of these audits.227 
As environmental conditions have continued to deteriorate in China, 
the public is becoming increasingly militant in demanding greater 
transparency. Barbara Finamore, NRDC’s Asia Director, expresses 
optimism that China may move toward regular publication of emissions 
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data by adopting some form of Pollution Release and Transfer Register, as 
more than 50 other countries have done.228 
 
2. The Government’s Information Disclosure and NGOs 
 
China’s former State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA) issued the “environmental impact assessment of public 
participation in the Interim Measures” which came into force on March 18, 
2006.229 Pursuant to Article 11 of these regulations construction units or 
their authorized environmental impact assessment agency can take 
measures to facilitate public understanding of the environmental impact 
assessment report.230 
China has adopted freedom of information regulations very similar to 
those in effect in the United States. The State Council’s regulations on the 
Disclosure of Government Information and Disclosure of Environmental 
Information (Trial) both took effect on May 1, 2008.231 The Regulation of 
Disclosure of Government Information is known as the third revolution of 
Chinese government reform. Its significance is to provide a legal guarantee 
for the public’s right to know.232 Compared to China’s corporate 
information disclosure, environmental information disclosure by the 
government represents a very significant step forward. Many 
environmental NGOs and even research scholars and students now can 
obtain information. 
Of course due to the restriction of disseminating information to the 
people in the history of Chinese culture, government information disclosure 
in China has still a long way to go. After China’s implementation of the 
information disclosure law through government information disclosure 
regulations some environmental NGOs who sought information often were 
frustrated. Less than half of local governments responded positively to such 
information requests.233 
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Some environmental information is still closely guarded by the 
Chinese government.  It is widely believed that China has serious problems 
of soil contamination. In 2006, the State Environmental Protection Agency 
(now MEP) and the Ministry of Land launched an extensive survey of soil 
contamination problems in China. The study took four years, but when it 
was completed the data it collected were not released to the public. Beijing 
lawyer, Dong Zhengwei submitted a request for government disclosure of 
the results of the study.234 However, China’s MEP refused to disclose it, 
citing the need to protect “national secrets.”235 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Concern about environmental problems has spawned the growth of 
environmental NGOs in both the U.S. and China. Environmental NGOs in 
China can be divided into three categories – official NGOs, international 
NGOs, and grassroots NGOs. Because of heavy state control of NGOs, 
each of these groups operates in a much more confined legal and political 
environment than their counterparts in the United States. However, 
environmental NGOs in China seem to have greater freedom than NGOs 
that focus on other issues. While international NGOs generally have greater 
resources than the other environmental NGOs, it is not easy for them to get 
the registration permit from the Chinese government, and their range of 
activities is limited. Grassroots NGOs generally lack sufficient financial 
and professional support, thereby restricting the role that they can play. 
Official NGOs in China are in the best position to operate because of their 
relatively richer social resources, and their comparatively wider network of 
contacts in the government. 
China is now moving to make it easier for NGOs to operate. In the 
long run, the development of grassroots NGOs may prove to be the best 
indicator of social progress. Experience in the U.S. has demonstrated that 
environmental NGOs can help improve environmental policy as EPA and 
other federal agencies have become much more responsive to citizens’ 
concerns due to interactions with NGOs. Yet comparison of the role of civil 
society in environmental policy in the U.S. and China demonstrates the 
naiveté of simple assumptions that the U.S. legal system should be 
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transplanted to China. 
China clearly has more serious problems than the U.S. with 
enforcement of its environmental laws. China’s experience reflects in part 
the greater decentralization of its system of environmental law with local 
environmental protection boards having considerable power. To be sure 
“the idea that local officials subvert the central leadership’s good 
intentions” on environmental issues has become a “familiar narrative in 
Chinese politics” but one that is important to approach with a good degree 
of nuance.236 A survey of Chinese NGOs reports that NGO leaders have a 
more positive opinion of local leaders than the general public in China.237 
Local efforts to protect economically important industries in China are real, 
but it is too simplistic “to call the central government pro-environment and 
the local government pro-growth.”238 In several provinces efforts are being 
made to adopt innovative measures to protect the environment, including 
the creation of environmental courts. In similar fashion, some U.S. states 
have adopted innovative measures to control environmental problems that 
go far beyond what the federal government has required. California, for 
example, has been pursuing a statewide cap-and-trade program to control 
greenhouse gas emissions within the state. But overall China’s experience 
demonstrates the reality of the “race to the bottom” hypothesis that was a 
major justification for the high degree of centralization embodied in the 
U.S. environmental laws. 
It is much easier to enact environmental legislation in China, because 
of its one party system, than it is in the U.S. Environmentalists in China 
need not worry about legislative gridlock, but this also may be a factor in 
China’s greater difficulty with enforcement of its environmental laws. U.S. 
environmental laws are the product of hard fought compromises between 
environmentalists and the regulated community, which may lend greater 
legitimacy to the laws leading industry to take them more seriously. 
Experience with citizen suits in the U.S. indicates that they have 
played a vital role in forcing agencies to issue regulations to implement the 
environmental laws. However, they have not been as significant a factor in 
enforcement of regulations except in cases where violations are easy for 
citizens to prove. There is no current prospect that China will permit citizen 
suits against central government agencies, but this type of litigation is less 
necessary in China because industry lobbyists do not block the State 
Council from issuing regulations. Chinese law is moving toward express 
recognition of citizen suits against polluters, at least when brought by 
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official NGOs. The U.S. experience suggests that such lawsuits can be 
useful, but they are no panacea for chronic enforcement problems in light 
of the difficulty of proving violations in many cases. 
The emphasis some Chinese environmental NGOs are placing on 
transparency and disclosure initiatives appears to be a creative strategy that 
enables them to effect change without threatening the established legal 
order. The development of environmental NGOs in China is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, but barring an unexpected backlash from the central 
government, it is likely that their growth will continue. It is likely that these 
NGOs will continue to promote information disclosure and become more 
involved in monitoring administrative actions through litigation, and even 
playing a greater role in influencing the development of legislation and 
regulations. Potentially this could have a significant effect on development 
of the whole administrative legal system in China. Even at this stage, it is 
undeniable that Chinese environmental NGOs have contributed greatly to 
democratic consolidation in the environmental regime through public 
interest litigation and disclosure of environmental information. 
Despite substantial differences between the Chinese legal system and 
that of the U.S., environmental concerns have become so urgent in China 
and much of the world that they are inspiring efforts by NGOs to reverse 
the laxity of administrative supervision. Chinese NGOs are trying every 
means to expose existing environmental problems in China and to demand 
better environmental protection policies. Environmental protection is a 
common concern of mankind supported by universal values throughout the 
world. China’s difficulties with environmental enforcement should provide 
a cautionary lesson for those in the U.S. who advocate relaxing federal 
regulation and devolving greater environmental authority to lower levels of 
government. The road that U.S. environmental NGOs have traveled 
provides valuable experience to inform China’s efforts to build a stronger 
civil society. 
 
